Candidate Recruitment and Selection in Latin America: A Framework for Analysis

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ABSTRACT

This article provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the recruitment and selection of legislative candidates in Latin America. It argues that political recruitment and candidate selection are undertheorized for Latin America yet have determinative impacts on political systems, often overriding the influence of more commonly studied institutional variables. The article elucidates a typology of legislative candidates based on the legal and party variables that lead to the emergence of particular selection methods, as well as the patterns of loyalty generated by those methods. It analyzes the recruitment and selection processes as independent and dependent variables, underscoring the significant effect these procedures have on the incentive structure and subsequent behavior of legislators. Those factors, in turn, have important consequences for democratic governability and the performance of presidentialism.

In the United States, legislative campaigning requires that candidates raise much of their own funding, create advertising, appear on television, organize supporters, target legislation, and send out mass mailings. Partisanship influences campaigns and policy positions, but legislators also consider local constituency demands in determining political postures and strategies. In Colombia and Brazil, legislative candidates and legislators do many of the same things, butclientelism also is at play. Partisanship is an even less important motivator for legislators in these countries than in the United States. Many Brazilian legislators, furthermore, are beholden to state-level politicians, and many more than in the United States retire to state-level political or bureaucratic jobs after a stint in the legislature.

Argentine legislative candidates, by contrast, are motivated by partisanship to such an extent that they almost never vote against their party in Congress. Their campaigns are dominated by newcomers, since so few Argentine legislators are re-elected. In these contests, the individual candidates have much less responsibility for raising funds or organizing supporters, though many are still involved in meeting local leaders and distributing particularistic goods. Uruguayan legislators
share some of those campaign features, but this country’s defined factionalism leads legislators to consider district, factional, and partisan issues in defining their campaigns and political strategies. Some Bolivian legislators represent another distinct type: they are clearly tied to a particular social group. As a result, these politicians’ campaigns and legislative careers are built around meeting the needs of that group, be it rural farmers or ethnic separatists.

What explains these different types of candidates and their resultant political behavior? An important determinant is the institutional framework in which the candidates operate. Theories based solely on legal variables, however, are incomplete and perhaps flawed, because too often they expect uniform responses or ignore contextual variables. For example, since Duverger (1954), analysts often expect a singular response to incentives stemming from the electoral system. The framework for a house, however, influences without determining its inside layout and decor. In turn, parties operating under identical institutional frameworks may take many different forms. Tastes and costs determine a house’s inside configuration, and parties’ goals and opportunities lead them to react to institutional stimuli in distinct ways. Analyses of presidents, legislatures, parties, or executive legislative relations, therefore, must consider the factors that combine or interact with the institutional environment to explain political behavior.

Recent scholarship has, of course, moved well beyond Duverger in exploring the impact of legal variables on legislative behavior (Shugart and Carey 1992; Carey and Shugart 1995; Cox 1997). Recognizing that electoral systems did not have uniform effects on legislators’ behavior, political science began considering the factors that add to or interact with legal variables. By focusing on political recruitment and candidate selection—legislators’ pathways to power—this article identifies and describes a central underlying framework that bounds political behavior. This framework and its impact are explored with a focus on legislative candidates in Latin America.

A country’s legal framework and formal institutions clearly create pressures that push political parties in particular ways, but not all parties react similarly. This differentiated response results from the variance in parties’ goals, norms, and strategies and the interaction of those factors with the legal environment. For example, while one party could use a country’s closed-list electoral rules to assure centralized control over legislative candidate nominations, another party could decentralize that power to provincial leaders. Here the electoral system would interact with party organizational variables—which may be dependent on the party’s size, age, and initial development—to determine the process of candidate nominations. Likewise, competitive pressures, a party’s regional strength, its ideological coherence, and many other factors will
influence whether national party leaders, provincial party leaders, or voters will have the greatest say in naming legislative candidates. Formal institutional rules (such as electoral systems and federalism) combine and interact with contextual situations (such as structures of party competition) and party-level variables (such as ideological coherence, fractionalization of the leadership, and party organization) to determine particular selection methods.

This study does not intend to build a fully specified model of legislative behavior. Instead, the approach here complements extant institutionally based analyses by underscoring new and heretofore underanalyzed variables that affect legislator behavior. The goal is expressly theory building, albeit theory building in its first stages, aimed at setting out sets of hypothesized relationships, which need further investigation and testing before their causal power can be determined.

Along these lines, this article develops an argument about the interaction of specific aspects of the electoral system with party and contextual variables in determining the recruitment and selection process and candidate type. It develops the idea of candidates’ loyalty to a particular selectorate, be it constituents or some higher party official. The direction of loyalty determines several candidate types, which are correlated with campaign and postelectoral behavior to show the influence of candidate type as an independent variable. This leads to a conclusion about the significant but often overlooked impact of recruitment and selection (hereafter R&S) variables on democratic process and governability.

**Why Pathways to Power Matter**

A key goal of institutionalist scholars has been to establish the relationship between electoral systems and party outcomes, with a particular focus on party discipline in the legislature and the nature of the party system (Ames 2001; Carey and Shugart 1995; Morgenstern 2004; Samuels 1999; Siavelis 2002; Shugart 1995). By failing to consider how the electoral system interacts with recruitment and selection variables, however, these studies cannot explain the types of candidates and parties and the resulting levels of discipline that emerge in different countries. Institutionalists have generally shied away from studying R&S because in addition to legal statutes and party rules, the associated variables include some unwritten party norms that are notoriously difficult to measure. If we are interested in analyzing the effect of political institutions, however, we must understand the totality of incentives operating on politicians, many of which are rooted in the R&S procedures.

The importance of R&S has not escaped scholars who focus on European parliamentary governments or the United States. Gallagher and Marsh (1988), for example, build on the early “classic” literature
(Black 1972; Marvick 1968; Prewitt 1970; Czudnowski 1975) and provide a comprehensive treatment of R&S issues, to which Norris (1997) and Davis (1988) have made important additional contributions. However, this literature generally ignores Latin America’s predominantly multi-party presidential systems. Literature focusing on Latin America has begun to appear (Buquet 2001; Camp 1995; Langston 2001; Siavelis 2002), but the case studies that have resulted have not yet generated a theoretically oriented comparative study.

A second limitation of the extant literature is that irrespective of the regional focus, most scholars interested in theory building tend to treat the R&S process primarily as either a dependent variable (analyzing how politicians are recruited and selected) or an independent variable (analyzing the effect of the recruitment processes on subsequent political behavior). No study of which we are aware does both simultaneously, despite the significant insights that can be gleaned by doing so. For this reason, we lack an overarching framework for understanding political recruitment, candidate selection, and their consequences.

Another shortcoming in the literature is the failure to consider adequately how institutions combine with informal processes. Following Helmke and Levitsky (2004), this study distinguishes between formal party (and faction and coalition) rules, federal statutes, and informal norms or procedures that guide the implementation of the “parchment” rules or laws. Parties develop rules, whether formally inscribed or not, with respect to seniority, incumbency, and the candidacy rights of militants or outsiders. Some party rules and processes yield centralized control over nomination decisions and tightly guarded campaign finances, while others allow primaries and encourage candidates to raise and spend their own funds. Most of these rules and processes are compatible with different types of electoral systems, and all can tighten or loosen the relation of candidates to party leadership. Thus, while electoral rules create the context for candidate selection, they interact with informal and formal party rules to determine the types of candidates chosen, as well as their behavior during and after campaigns. Argentina provides a good example of how this interaction works.

**Recruitment Versus Selection**

Political recruitment can be defined as the way potential candidates are attracted to compete for political office, whereas candidate selection is the process by which candidates are chosen from among the pool of potential candidates. While Norris (1997), Hazan (2002), Camp (1995), and others have tried to work within these analytical distinctions, the processes involved are so entangled that it is seldom possible to determine where recruitment ends and selection begins. Norris, for example,
usefully divides the legal and party variables that affect how candidates become elected officials into three levels: system variables (legal, electoral, and party variables), recruitment structures (party organization, rules, and ideology), and the recruitment process (how eligibles get elected, including candidate motivations, party gatekeepers, and electoral choice). These divisions are blurry, however, because several items could fit into more than one category. An explanation of the behavior of politicians before and after elections would be incomplete and perhaps misleading if the processes were separated. Different aspects of the R&S process take prominence in different countries, moreover, or even in different parties in a single country.

Because we are interested in where the loyalties of candidates lie, we must also consider the long-term process of R&S. It is often the same elites that cultivate, identify, and name candidates, beginning a process that ends with candidate selection and the potential cementing of loyalties. The process of building loyalty, therefore, is not located solely at the point of actual selection. It is even possible for candidates to self-recruit and self-nominate, taking the recruitment and selection process into their own hands, with important consequences for legislator discipline, executive behavior, and democratic governability.

Recruitment and selection thereby overlap to such an extent that, for the purpose of this study, it is useful to analyze them as a single process. The variables that define these processes may be more pertinent to one or the other concept, but they are closely tied, and do not clearly fit under one rubric or the other. This relationship is depicted in figure 1. It shows three baskets of variables. On the far left are those that are most closely identified with political recruitment: education, political contacts, and career trajectories. On the right are those variables most associated with candidate selection, such as the rules that govern...
access to the ballot by setting up primaries, endowing governors with powers to choose candidates, or allowing candidates to self-nominate. In the middle are those variables that pertain to both processes, such as the party system and the parties’ organizational structure. Here we are thinking of parties’ decisionmaking structure (hierarchical or decentralized), their coalitional calculations, and their ideological bent.

The vertical dotted lines in the figure divide these three groups of variables, and the diagonal line differentiates recruitment from selection processes. Overall, the figure is meant to imply that the variables cannot be bifurcated; some variables are central to recruitment and selection, and even those that are most closely associated with one process also have relevance for the other. Because our interest is in political institutions, this article focuses primarily on the middle and righthand boxes, though it also recognizes the importance of variables fitting into the left-hand box.

LOYALTY AS AN ORGANIZING CONCEPT

The goal of this study is to develop a typology based on loyalty as an organizing concept, and then to use that typology to discuss legislator behavior. It will therefore focus on how different sets of variables interact to affect candidates’ and hence legislators’ loyalties. The use of loyalty as an organizing principle is an extension of standard career-advancing models of politicians’ behaviors. Studies of the U.S. Congress typically assume that incumbents are driven to win re-election, and derive behavior from that premise. This study extends these discussions by assuming that politicians’ electoral (or postelectoral) goals are shaped by voters, societal groups, regional bosses, or party leaders who control nominations and the routes to office. To assure re-election or to achieve other postelectoral goals, then, the legislators must demonstrate loyalty to the groups that control the pathways to power.

This approach complements standard rational choice approaches by focusing on the direction of politicians’ loyalties and the implications thereof. Loyalty extends standard theory in several ways. First, rational choice explanations focus primarily on formal institutions and pay less attention to informal ones (see Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Informal processes, including those driven by candidate loyalties, frequently determine candidate selection in Latin America and elsewhere. Recognizing the incentives inherent in informal institutions, then, is necessary for understanding politicians’ behavior. In addition, legally based rational choice analyses tend to focus on one or a few institutions at a time. This study, in contrast, seeks to uncover the interactive effect of multiple institutional and party variables on decisions across time. The practical effect of these decisions is to endear candidates to (or alienate them from)
those who control future careers. Loyalty is therefore a more useful way to characterize the development of these multicausal relationships.

Second, loyalty helps capture the long-term iterated recruitment and selection process, regardless of politicians’ desired career path. Mayhew’s (1974) view of legislators as single-minded seekers of re-election does not work particularly well for Latin America, because there, few politicians seek long-term legislative careers. Furthermore, in focusing on the United States, Mayhew’s model assumes self-nominating legislative candidates, but that is nonsensical for most other cases. Changing these assumptions to variables leads to the idea that politicians should continually cultivate relationships with those responsible for recruiting and choosing candidates in order to pursue first a legislative post and then other positions. By implication, prospective candidates must see the legislature as a necessary step to future career goals. In pursuit of a legislative post, then, political aspirants should cultivate positive relationships with those who choose candidates. It is likely that these same people, be they voters, party leaders, or affiliates of particular societal groups, will also be influential in assuring future positions.

Third, our model harks back to Hirschman, who focused on loyalty as a rational option for politicians when exit or voice was too costly. Defining the targets of politicians’ loyalty and then using that relationship to predict behavior is therefore a straightforward extension of Hirschman’s view that “the most loyalist behavior retains an enormous dose of reasoned calculation” (1970, 79).

Our model thus assumes that politicians are motivated by rational self-interest in the pursuit of legislative posts and future careers. Loyalty plays a central role in this pursuit because politicians who make rational or strategic choices should work to maintain positive relationships with those who control their chosen career paths. As Mayhew (1974) and others contend, understanding the politicians’ motivations generates an understanding of their behavior.

A brief example illustrates both the utility of loyalty as a concept and the way it extends or complements standard rational choice analyses. In small-magnitude electoral districts, the legally based rational choice literature would predict legislator behavior aimed at the cultivation of constituent loyalty. In large-magnitude closed-list systems, by contrast, politicians should cultivate loyalty to party leaders who control access to the lists and list position. The direction of these loyalties, then, should yield different behaviors by the politicians in their campaigns and once they attain office.

These legally based hypotheses, however, ignore other motivators of politicians’ behavior. After election, the legislators will turn their attention to future posts. If re-election is not desirable or allowed, the legislators should court the selectorate for the next post. In many
instances, it is likely that the same voters, party elite, or regional bosses who put the legislators into office will also hold the keys to that legislator’s future jobs, and in these cases the legislator will continue showing loyalty to those patrons. But if others hold those keys, then loyalties (and the resulting behavior) should shift. Legally based rational choice assumptions thus are too constraining; but adding loyalty as an organizing concept focuses attention on a larger range of incentives that determine legislative behavior.

Because this study asserts that loyalty is a central determinant of behavior, its typology is organized around how R&S processes cement legislators’ loyalties to party elites, to constituents, to the selfish interests of the politicians themselves, or to particular groups in society. In concrete terms, where loyalties lie requires the candidates and legislators to consider their benefactor when taking policy stances, deciding which bills to sponsor, and distributing public resources.

In addition, the ability to achieve goals, for both the president and legislators, is predicated on building working majorities in Congress. Legislators who are loyal to the party will respect party discipline and, when part of the president’s party or coalition, will be more likely to heed the executive’s will. The incentives for loyalty to the party and, in turn, the likelihood that presidents can rely on disciplined majorities rests partly with R&S; and this has important consequences for the efficiency, and potentially the stability, of presidential, and especially multiparty presidential systems. This study argues, then, that loyalty is a useful concept for differentiating candidates because legislators consider their patrons and supporters when making decisions about career paths, the loftier goals of public service, campaign styles, policy promises, and whether to fall into disciplined line with government or opposition coalitions.

**A Narrow Typology with Wider Implications**

Figure 2 provides a schematic of our approach to understanding the outcome of legislative R&S. It first treats the emergent candidate’s type as a dependent variable, asking about the parchment and party variables that determine candidate loyalties and resulting candidate type. As a flow chart, the figure suggests that aspirants first confront legal variables that predispose their loyalties toward certain actors. Party variables then act as an accelerant or a brake—indicated by the multiplication function between the two boxes—to further shape the evolution and nature of these loyalties, leading to the emergence of four ideal types of candidates: party loyalists, constituent servants, entrepreneurs, and group delegates.

The right half of figure 2 shows the R&S outcome as an independent variable, asking how candidate type affects subsequent political
behavior. These behavioral issues include campaign behavior, personal vote seeking, representative orientation, the propensity to engage in patronage politics and logrolling, and legislative discipline and support for the president. Candidate behavior will also depend on the relative party majorities of presidents and legislators, which constrain or facilitate resource extraction. For example, legislators' power to extract resources should be significantly enhanced when they are members of a majority and share the same party as the president.

Once candidates are victorious, furthermore, rules regarding re-election and the question of whether candidates have static or progressive ambition continue to affect their thinking about re-entering the recruitment arena, which, in turn, will affect decisions about policy and behavior and whether or not to support the president. Figure 2 shows this effect as the electoral/party filter; it sorts out where candidates find themselves with respect to power relations during campaigns and after elections. The electoral/party filter essentially determines whether legislators belong to an opposition party (or coalition) or a president’s party. The rationale for including this filter is that incentives for loyalty, and therefore behavior (especially with respect to executive-legislative relations and party discipline), depend on whether or not legislators belong to parties that have workable legislative majorities. This status can affect the incentives for sticking with or abandoning a president, toeing or rejecting the party line.

Figure 2 is intended as a descriptive heuristic device, showing the very large number of potential interactions among the variables that yield...
multiple paths to power and the politicians’ resulting allegiances. Yet it is unrealistic and largely unrewarding (if not impossible) to test an endless series of hypotheses related to the effect of each variable on candidate loyalties. This study therefore relies on a rough form of path analysis to sort out variables and generate the typology of candidates. For this analysis, each variable represents a node on a type of decision tree that charts different candidates’ paths to power. Unlike a strict game-theoretic choice model, this one does not assume that candidates are choosing at each node, that rules are predetermined and inflexible, or that parties or other leaders have previously chosen a particular path that legislators must follow. We do mean to imply, however, that each variable affects candidate behavior and restricts options farther down the path.

We begin with legal variables because we posit that they predispose parties toward the selection of particular types of candidates, and then consider party variables for their role in either reinforcing or undermining these predispositions. For example, district magnitude makes the emergence of some types of candidates more likely and other types less likely. Small-magnitude systems are more likely to produce candidates with loyalty to constituents than are large-magnitude systems because name recognition and identifiability are more important. Once the list type variable is introduced, however, a candidate in a closed-list system with moderate magnitude will have slightly more of an incentive to be loyal to the party to ensure a beneficial list position. With an open-list system, in contrast, this outcome is less likely because voter recognition, rather than list position, will matter more to electoral success. This reality will push candidate loyalty more toward constituents than toward the party, because the party has less influence over the candidate’s electability. Subsequently, however, if parties have very elite-centered and centralized forms of organization and candidate designation, candidate loyalty might be pulled back toward the party.

This approach still has a problem. The interaction of all the variables influencing R&S produces an even greater number of potential paths to explore. Just the 5 legal and 4 party-level variables produce 40 (5×4×2) potential paths, and this assumes that each decision node yields binary options, which is clearly an oversimplification. Such a model is scarcely a parsimonious contribution to understanding the origins of different types of candidates.

This study argues, however, that each of these paths, though distinct, tends to arrive at one of four destinations, which constitute the four ideal types of candidates. This occurs because distinct combinations of variables can interact to push and pull in different directions, but they tend to push and pull candidate loyalty toward or away from four key actors in the R&S process: party elites, constituents, the candidates themselves, or particular corporate or functional groups (trade unions or ethnic, reli-
gious, or regional groups). Therefore, while complexity abounds in how loyalties are cultivated in the interaction of variables, each variable tends to enhance or diminish loyalties to those who are recognized as the key actors in the recruitment and selection process. From these variations, four respective paths to power can be charted; and these correspond to the four ideal types of candidates identified (party loyalists, constituent servants, entrepreneurs, and group delegates).

More important is that from the multiple paths, we can identify four where all variables reinforce one another to push candidates toward one of the ideal types. This is a heuristic exercise, which sheds light on the formation of candidate loyalties while allowing us to explore how departures from the ideal typical path play out empirically, still to arrive at one of the destinations, albeit via a different route.

There is also a temporal element to the process of loyalty development. The nodes of the paths are generally ordered in line with the gradual and sequenced development of loyalties; that is, legal variables create the context and essentially the starting gate, and party variables shape the later development of candidates. However, variations among countries in the timing of the process mean that although different nodes along the path will all appear, they may appear at different times and in different sequences. Certain variables, furthermore, tend to travel together. Elite selection tends to covary with bureaucratized parties, and selection by primaries tends to covary with patronage-based parties.

**BUILDING THE CANDIDATE TYPOLOGY**

The legal and party independent variables shown in figure 2 are the ones most often identified as significant in the candidate selection literature. This study does consider many of the variables that are common to the institutionalist literature, but it adds to the previous approaches by exploring interactions among legal variables, formal and informal variables, and legal and party variables. Much of the literature considers one or the other side of a dualistic relationship between two of these variables without enough attention to how their interaction affects candidate type and, in turn, legislator behavior.

**Legal Variables**

*District magnitude and list type.* As Carey and Shugart (1995) explain, district magnitude and list type are intimately connected with respect to the incentive structure they produce. Therefore they are discussed together here for analytical purposes. Carey and Shugart argue that in closed-list systems, candidate qualities lose importance as district
magnitude increases, because the party becomes more central to nomination. In essence, they contend that in closed-list systems, the incentive to cultivate a personal reputation decreases as magnitude increases, while in open-list systems the value of personal reputation increases as magnitude increases. In the smallest-magnitude closed-list system, such as a single-member district, voters can still identify candidates representing the different parties, and therefore the candidates’ personal reputations and campaign skills influence the vote. Those same candidates, however, might be anonymous when district magnitude grows, as voters must choose a large team rather than single players.

Under open-list systems, by contrast, Carey and Shugart argue that the value of a candidate’s personal reputation actually increases as district magnitude increases because voters always have to choose among individuals, and differentiating oneself through cultivating a personal reputation becomes more important, so as to not get lost among a crowded field of candidates. We concur with their theory with respect to the incentives of various systems to cultivate a personal vote.

There is a difference, however, between the value of personal reputation at a single election (i.e., a personal vote) and the importance of cultivating loyalty to pursue long-term goals. This difference prompts us to modify Carey and Shugart’s argument. Their assertions regarding closed lists apply almost directly to our argument concerning loyalty, and we concur with them. However, with open-list systems, we diverge from Carey and Shugart’s logic to argue that as district magnitude increases, the value of personal reputation in the election may increase, but the incentive and ability to cultivate the loyalty of the party or constituents for the long term actually decreases. With large-magnitude open-list systems, parties become almost irrelevant, given the low thresholds of victory and the decreased importance of a party label. With respect to cultivating constituent loyalty, while the incentive to cultivate a personal reputation is high at the time of election, the incentive and the ability to do so over the longer term while serving as a legislator are lower, simply because among the crowded field of legislators in a district, it is difficult to place credit or blame and to hold individual legislators accountable. Therefore we argue that over time, large- or moderate-magnitude closed-list systems will provide an incentive to cultivate loyalty to parties; low-magnitude open- and closed-list systems will provide an incentive to cultivate balanced loyalty to the party and constituents; and large-magnitude open-list systems generate little long-term loyalty to constituents or parties.

Re-election. Whether or not re-election is permitted is central to determining the loyalty of candidates. If re-election is barred, candidates are likely to cultivate prospective loyalty toward those who influence their future career destination rather than retrospective loyalty to those
who brought them to power. Where re-election is allowed, this retrospective loyalty will remain strong in an effort to ensure candidate reelection (for a full discussion see Carey 1998).

**Geographic organization.** In federal systems, decentralized politics make the emergence of decentralized parties more likely, decreasing the power and influence of national party elites. In addition, localized politics is likely to make the cultivation of loyalty among local political actors (be they party elites, militants, or constituents) more central to being designated as a candidate. Chhibber and Kollman (2004) underscore the effect of the particular type of federalism on the nature of parties and party systems, noting that where centralization of authority occurs there is less opportunity for state or national parties to thrive. Building on this argument, this study contends that when provincial or state party leaders wield real authority over candidate selection, candidates have an incentive to serve and remain loyal to these leaders. In unitary systems, lines of loyalty are more likely to trace back to national party elites.

**Legislative strength.** Following Polsby (1968), we expect that the strength of the legislature is crucial in determining the incentives for inducing legislators to channel their ambition in progressive or static directions. Strong legislatures provide members with power and prestige; and when legislators wield real control over resources, they also provide individual legislators the power to extract those resources. Though we have placed legislative strength and the resulting desirability of a career in the legislature in the category of legal variables, with the idea that constitutions can create stronger or weaker legislatures, other factors are also determinative. Examples are the number of parties and the legislator’s position relative to the legislative majority, court decisions that can enhance or diminish legislative powers, and the bureaucratization of the legislature that enhances its policy role. If being a legislator has prestige and the institution has real power over resources, legislators have an incentive to stay and cultivate loyalty to whoever brought them to power. Legislators with progressive ambition may forgo the cultivation of such loyalty because it is not central to their future prospects.

**Party Variables**

**Centralization (or where candidates are chosen).** Many observers have stressed the importance of how much centralization figures in candidate selection processes (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Hazan 2002; Norris 1996). When the main actors are national or regional party executives, candidate selection will cement candidate loyalty toward these party leaders. In contrast, when the key players are located in the con-
stituencies and include members, voters, and local party officers, legislator loyalty will have a local base.

Norris provides a cogent discussion of the importance of the degree of centralization in candidate designation. Because she focuses on the institutionalized parties that exist in most of the countries she analyzes, however, she does not allow for potentially inchoate or informal decisionmaking structures. In such systems, moreover, voters may lack strong partisan identification, thereby sharply diminishing the importance of a crucial party prerogative: control over the party label. In other words, when partisan identification is low, party leaders cannot seriously threaten potential candidates by withholding nominations, because recalcitrants can switch parties without significant costs. As a result, such systems may produce legislators with local bases of support in spite of centralized nomination rules. It is also possible, however, that these systems will produce populist leaders whose long coattails smother local candidates’ independence. Another alternative, following Hazan, is corporate decisionmaking, in which the process is organized along functional rather than geographic lines. Hazan notes that this may involve a central role for groups such as “trade unions, women, minorities, etc.” in the designation process (2002, 14).

The location where candidates are chosen, therefore, can push candidates to curry favor toward national actors, regional actors, or corporate actors; or, indeed, it can make the cultivation of regional or national loyalties less relevant once initial selection or self-selection has taken place. The “where question,” however, clearly interacts with legal and other party variables. Decentralized selection is more likely, for example, in federal systems, thus again suggesting the importance of considering the full model rather than single variables in isolation.

Inclusiveness (or who chooses candidates). Essentially, inclusiveness involves the number of people involved in candidate choice, with important implications for candidate loyalty. While inclusiveness and centralization can overlap, candidate choice can be decentralized yet exclusive, with local notables choosing candidates; or it can be decentralized and inclusive if a local open primary is employed to choose candidates.6

Indeed, ultimate control of selection can even be centralized yet inclusive. For example, Navia (2004) notes that the highly centralized Chilean Christian Democratic Party mandated a decentralized candidate selection process in an effort to “democratize” the party. In addition, there are different forms of exclusivity. A candidate chosen by a few party elites and a candidate who self-selects both represent exclusive selection procedures. However, the incentives for loyalty for each type of candidate will be quite different.

When party elites choose candidates, loyalty to the party will reign supreme; but when open primaries are used, the cultivation of con-
stituent loyalty will be more important. Where self-selection or informality is the norm (for any number of possible reasons), loyalty to self will be most important—especially where re-election is not allowed—and self-serving behavior will be the norm. Where a corporate group is key to selection, loyalty to that group will follow.

**Party organization (or how candidates are chosen).** Norris (1996) notes the importance of the extent of bureaucratization in the candidate selection process. She differentiates between processes that rely on highly institutionalized and rule-based patterns of recruitment and those that rely on a patronage formula based on the activities of powerbrokers and key gatekeepers, who may or may not represent particular factions in political parties. The degree to which key individuals are constrained by organizational rules ultimately determines the leaders’ power to demand personal loyalty from prospective candidates. In bureaucratized systems, the party follows elaborate rules for candidate designation and can dictate the terms of ballot access and prevent those deemed undesirable from running under a party label. In patronage systems, by contrast, ultimately the candidate choice emerges from conflicts and compromises between leaders. If other deals become complicated, one possible means of resolution is a primary election.

In this sense, it is important to note that bureaucratization is not synonymous with formality; party decisionmaking patterns may be bureaucratized and formal or bureaucratized and informal. In patronage systems, patrons (informal powerbrokers) may use formal structures to block or promote candidacies. For example, Norris argues that U.S. parties use patronage-based selection (1996, 205). However tempting it is to argue, therefore, that informal self-selection is the norm (suggesting lack of bureaucratization), U.S. parties use bureaucratized methods (primaries) to resolve conflicts among informal patronage groups, such as campaign contributors, campaign volunteers, and political action committees. Therefore, in the United States, parties are patronage-based yet bureaucratized.

Some recruitment systems, however, are simply patronage-based and characterized by nonbureaucratized nomination norms (primarily self-nomination). The crucial difference between bureaucratized and nonbureaucratized systems is the extent to which party organizations still matter in resolving conflicts between patronage groups. Where parties and related organizations matter less and nonbureaucratized self-nomination is the norm, we dub the party organization variable inchoate.

In yet another type of system, functional or corporate groups have nomination or veto power over candidacies. These groups can wield power and use methods of selection with varying degrees of bureaucratization and formality, but what is significant is that the corporate or functional group has the last word on nominations.
Table 1. Ideal Types of Legislative Candidates and Their Ideal Typical Paths to Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Variables</th>
<th>Party Loyalist</th>
<th>Constituent Servant</th>
<th>Entrepreneur</th>
<th>Group Delegate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>District magnitude</td>
<td>Moderate (4–6) or</td>
<td>Low (1–3)</td>
<td>High (7 or over)</td>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High (7 or over)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>List type</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Open or Closed</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Geographic organization</td>
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<td>Federal</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
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<td>Legislative strength</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party Variables</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Localized</td>
<td>Localized</td>
<td>Corporate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>Elite selection</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Self-selection</td>
<td>Role for functional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusiveness</td>
<td>Bureaucratized</td>
<td>Patronage-based</td>
<td>Inchoate or party</td>
<td>group in selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>identification irrelevant</td>
<td>Group-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party organization</td>
<td>Party control/state financing through party</td>
<td>State financing to individuals/independents</td>
<td>Private business/self-financing</td>
<td>Financing by/through functional groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Highly bureaucratized systems will promote candidate loyalty toward the party and its rule enforcers, while patronage-based systems will push loyalties toward particular party patrons, or primary voters who hold the key to resolving conflicts between them. The cultivation of loyalty will be a less visible and important force where inchoate selection is the norm, while designation by a functional group will create candidate loyalty to that group.

Campaign finance (who pays the bills). Control over financial resources is a central determinant of candidate loyalty. The path of money and the path of loyalty usually run parallel. Where parties control the purse strings (either through private financing or the distribution of state money), loyalty to the party is enhanced. Where party or state money is disbursed and spent at the discretion of individual candidates, or where candidates raise their own money from constituents, loyalty to the party will be relatively less important to the candidates. The result should be more attention to district interests by the winning candidates. Similarly, where functional groups or businesses foot the bill for campaigns, candidates will owe relatively less loyalty to parties and more to these patrons. If the candidates themselves are the source of funding, they are likely to act in the name of self-promotion.

**THE LEGISLATOR/CANDIDATE TYPOLOGY**

Table 1 characterizes these ideal typical paths to power taken by each of the four types of candidates, focusing on the five legal variables (district magnitude, list type, re-election, geographical organization, and legislative strength) and four party variables (centralization, inclusiveness, party organization, and campaign finance). Though the many potential paths that determine where a candidate’s loyalty will lie have been noted, it bears repeating that the ideal paths charted here are those in which the paths taken at each node all align to push toward one of the ideal types. There are empirical examples of candidates following slightly different paths, but these usually can be considered subtypes of one of our four major types.

Table 1 indicates the values of the five legal and four party variables hypothesized to promote one of the four ideal-typical candidates (shown at the top of each column). Essentially, the table takes the two boxes in the independent variables section of figure 2 and charts the ideal typical path to one of the candidate types of candidates in the center. Because these are framework variables through which the candidate must work rather than decision nodes that allow candidate choice, the table does not imply a temporal evolution; still, the image of a decision tree is meant to suggest that there are multiple possible
combinations of the variables, with each direction implying a potentially different outcome. In addition, although the table highlights the importance of legal variables for three of the ideal types, it shows that certain legal variables have only minor importance for the group delegates, in order to suggest that this candidate type can emerge in a more varied institutional or legal environment. Therefore, these legal variables are less determinate than party variables and are designated as indeterminate. This position does not undermine the importance of institutional variables in the R&S process generally. Instead, the group delegates’ path provides an example that underscores a central thrust of our framework: in certain cases, party variables may trump legal ones, confounding institutionalists and their theoretical propositions about the relationship between legal variables and political outcomes.

Some additional notes of caution should be observed. First, in a given country, we are likely to find several types of candidates. As noted, this should be expected, because while formal institutions provide the incentive structures under which all parties operate, the parties may vary significantly in their internal characteristics. Second, while some nodes represent binary possibilities, not all of them do. Third, for the few categories that are noted as indeterminate, candidates may follow any of the paths on that node, as they have little effect on the type of candidate that ultimately emerges. It follows that certain paths are more likely and common than others, as certain combinations of the variables fit together more naturally than others. For example, decentralized candidate selection is more likely in federal systems than in unitary systems.

The analysis of the path of each type of candidate considers the mix of legal and party variables that conspire to produce particular types of candidates. Table 2 presents a brief summary of the arguments with respect to candidate type as an independent variable. The table is a guide to the central thrust of the argument, but by no means does it represent a comprehensive summary of the totality of legislator or candidate behavior. The discussion of each candidate type concludes with an empirical assessment of where the different types of candidates are found.

**Party Loyalists**

Loyalist candidates demonstrate and maintain loyalty toward party leaders and organizations that hold the key to their political futures. Table 1 notes that a fertile institutional environment for the development of a party loyalist is a proportional representation system with moderate or high magnitudes and closed lists. Each of these factors reinforces the power of the party and, in turn, the incentives of candidates to toe the party line. Closed lists make party identification important for winning and optimal party placement on the ballot crucial to victory, prompting
loyalty to the party. Table 1 somewhat arbitrarily defines moderate magnitude as between 4 and 6, and large magnitude as 7 or more legislators elected in given district. These numbers can vary slightly, but empirically what is important is whether the system produces the incentives related to loyalty described here. Party loyalists are more likely to emerge when re-election is allowed, in unitary political systems where centralized parties are more likely to exist, and where a strong legislature makes a legislative career desirable for reasons of status and control over resources.

With respect to party variables, loyalists will tend to emerge where candidate selection is centralized, dominated by elites, and bureaucratized. Where central elites wield control over candidate selection, potential candidates will do everything in their power to cultivate relationships with these elites, and they know that party rules will be followed. Thus, these legal and party variables combine to makes partisan identification more important to voters than individual candidate qualities, making loyalists beholden to the party to achieve their goals.

Table 2. Legislative Candidate Type as an Independent Variable, and Hypothesized Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Loyalist</th>
<th>Constituent Servant</th>
<th>Entrepreneur</th>
<th>Group Delegate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaign style</td>
<td>Extolling party platform</td>
<td>Appealing to constituents</td>
<td>Personalistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal vote seeking</td>
<td>Infrequent</td>
<td>Often/long-term</td>
<td>Often/short-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative orientation</td>
<td>Party before constituents</td>
<td>Constituents before party</td>
<td>Individualistic, rewarding supportive groups/individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of goods pursued</td>
<td>Collective, programmatic, ideological</td>
<td>Pork and public goods for district</td>
<td>Particularistic pork to reward supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative discipline/support for president</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate, can be bought with targeted pork</td>
<td>Low, self-interested voting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As noted in table 2, in terms of campaigns and campaign promises, the loyalist will campaign with a concern for presenting the major ideas, ideologies, and programs of the party. The one caveat is, of course, that in a federal system the loyalist may also campaign on issues that are more of a concern to the state or provincial party (though, of course, the interests of the state-level and national-level party are not necessarily mutually exclusive). The implications of loyalist behavior for party discipline and governability are clear. Loyalists will pursue collective goals related to the ideology and program of the party. Legislative parties full of loyalists are likely to be more disciplined, and presidents of the same party are more likely to be able to rely on majorities of their own party. Another issue is whether parties of loyalists will be more likely to form coalitions with other parties, or whether it is easier to buy support from more loosely organized parties when loyalists are from a different party than the president. For particular issues it may be easier for a president to seek support of entrepreneurial or constituent servant legislators, but these deals will not bring wide or deep support. Thus, while negotiations with loyalists of other parties will require important concessions, such negotiations can yield longer-lasting coalitions that can facilitate governance on a wide range of issues.

In empirical terms, Chilean legislators fit the profile of the party loyalist most closely (Navia 2004). Chile’s party loyalists are as much a product of the country’s very institutionalized parties as of its postauthoritarian political environment. Parties’ centralized structures, ironically, are reinforced by the need to strike coalition and alliance bargains—as predicted by our framework—because none of the highly disciplined parties of the Concertación coalition could achieve a majority alone. The electoral system variable suggests, by contrast, that Chilean legislators should tend to be constituent servants. But the reality of party loyalist legislators in Chile underscores one of this study’s key points. A principal legacy of Augusto Pinochet was the binomial legislative electoral system (with district magnitudes of 2), which created such strategic complexity that it put candidate selection into the hands of party elites. Therefore, a party system contextual variable (the need for coalitions in Chile’s multiparty system to sustain democracy) overcomes the forces pushing toward the development of constituent servants.

The construction of this coalition is largely underwritten by the informal mechanisms established by the member parties of the Concertación, underscoring our contention that legal and informal variables interact in determining candidate type and behavior. Furthermore, Chile’s other institutional and party system characteristics all align under the party loyalist type. It is notable that candidates tend to campaign in the manner attributed to loyalists, and party discipline is very high in legislative voting
Argentine legislators in general, and Peronist legislators in particular, can also be considered party loyalists. From the institutionalist perspective, Mark Jones describes a context based on a closed-list electoral system operating within a federalist system. Its two primary parties sometimes must share the political playing field with provincial parties and occasional important third parties at the national level (Jones 2004). Whereas in some countries (e.g., pre-Chávez Venezuela) these rules could yield national party elite control, in Argentina, informal processes instill candidate loyalty to provincial rather than national leaders (Levitsky 2003). Such processes include the provincial party elites’ power to nominate candidates, control campaign financing, and influence ex-legislators’ careers, as well as other aspects of patronage politics. Formal and informal variables have other influences. The lack of (formal) barriers to make new parties and the limited residency requirements for candidates, plus (on the informal side) voters who are willing to vote against the traditional parties, together allow disgruntled politicians to leave the party fold, thereby limiting the degree of discipline leaders can apply.

An important aspect of Jones’s study is the decision by parties to implement primaries. Though these are party-level rules rather than national structures, Jones’s discussion (2004) shows how the primaries create a context in which the parties and candidates react; winners are those who better control the party machinery, and financial resources are key. Therefore, it is also important to note that party loyalist types can vary, and candidates can be loyal to national parties, provincial parties, or, as in Uruguay (whose legislative candidates can also be considered party loyalists), party factions (Moraes 2004). Therefore, Argentine deputies, while party loyalists, are really provincial party loyalists.

This characterization has very interesting consequences for candidate behavior. Jones (2004) shows that Argentine legislators respond to the goals of the provincial party bosses. These bosses’ interests are best served by distributive policy, given that their hold on power is based primarily on patronage, pork, and clientelism. Therefore, Argentine deputies do attempt to deliver pork; but they do so not necessarily to satisfy the interests of constituents but to placate provincial party bosses, to whom they owe their loyalty. This also has implications for legislative behavior, albeit distinct from the logic of legislative behavior in Chile, where national rather than provincial party elites wield control.

**Constituent Servants**

Constituent servants are relatively more loyal to their constituents than to their parties, and can better achieve their goals through cultivating
constituent support. Returning to table 1, the legal variables that contribute to R&S procedures that produce servants include low-magnitude systems (again, somewhat arbitrarily set at between 1 and 3, echoing the caveat made with respect to the loyalist legislator) with either closed or open lists. Small-magnitude, open-list systems balance the incentives for candidates to be loyal to the party with additional strong incentives to cultivate loyalty among constituents. Parties may rank candidates, but voters still retain a good deal of influence in determining electoral outcomes. Small-magnitude systems thereby magnify the importance of individual candidacies and personalities irrespective of whether lists are open or closed; and this leads potential candidates to cultivate support among constituents. Permissive rules allowing re-election will reinforce this tendency. Constituent servants should be more common in federal systems, where local, decentralized ties will be crucial to election and re-election. Furthermore, a strong, well-institutionalized legislature, with established mechanisms for the acquisition and distribution of pork, will help legislators develop constituent loyalty.

Constituent servants thus will tend to emerge where the importance of the party label to an election is diluted by legal or party variables. Where the party label is relatively unimportant, decentralized selection is likely, and thus constituent loyalty should develop. The bureaucratized forms of selection in the upper levels of a centralized party, which characterize the development of loyalists, will here be displaced by local selection. The likely selectorate is a primary or some sort of decentralized party contest in which party elites do not exercise control, and in which the parties are patronage-based. Sources of independent or state financing will dilute the parties’ ability to use pecuniary means to induce loyalty.

In campaigns, servant candidates will be especially concerned with promoting policies and agendas that bear more particular significance for their districts. Similarly, the primary interest of constituent servants when legislating will be to please the people who chose them, and therefore they will be more likely than the other types of legislators to employ a strategy of patronage, aimed at cultivating support among local influential groups and political actors, as well as constituents. This will lead servants to pursue pork once in office; but unlike entrepreneurs, who may seek pork to benefit friends, and those who can advance a later political career beyond Congress, servants will seek benefits for the citizens of their districts simply to gain re-election.

With respect to party discipline, we expect relatively less discipline than among loyalists but more than either entrepreneurs or group delegates, because party organization still matters to both legislators and constituents. Support for the president, however, will ultimately be determined by how particular legislative votes play in the home district.
Constituent servants are defined by their weaker ties to parties; but in order to serve constituents, they may find that parties afford them the clout to extract resources and gain influence (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Aldrich 1995). The U.S. case suggests that these motivations support some degree of party discipline, and studies of divided government suggest that U.S. presidents have often been able to find the support they needed for important legislation (Mayhew 2002; Jones 2004). The number of parties is key, because the lack of a majority or near-majority party would severely hamper the president’s ability to find consistent support.

U.S. legislators fit into the constituent servant category. Of course, the low-magnitude U.S. election system, decentralized party organization, and federalism have all conspired to develop very decentralized selection and recruitment procedures. Still, it is not simply the election system that leads to the genesis of certain R&S procedures. Empirically, Lyne (2008) describes Brazil, especially before 1964, and Venezuela before the Chávez period as producing constituent servants. Clientelism and patronage were the currency of politics in these two countries, in spite of electoral systems that suggested very different incentive systems for the legislators. Langston’s analysis of Mexico suggests that PRD legislators and some Panistas typify constituent servants (Langston 2004). Concerned with choosing “good” candidates, these two parties have experimented with primaries to select legislative candidates with better ties to the electorate. The party-level decision as to the type of selection system is thus a key variable, but again, the electoral system and the “no re-election” clause are also central concerns. These examples, once again, show the need to go beyond electoral systems to explain candidate or politician types and behavior.

**Entrepreneurs**

Entrepreneurs bear little loyalty to parties or constituents, or at best, fleeting and instrumental loyalty to one or the other. These actors are more than simple “independent” candidates in the traditional sense of the term. Entrepreneurs may or may not be elected with a formal party label. In essence, they emerge where legal and institutional variables combine to make the selectorate the candidates themselves. Once chosen, however, their ambition tends to trump other policy or legislative goals.

The legal variables that influence recruitment patterns in ways that should produce entrepreneurs include high-magnitude electoral systems—which, with our caveats, we set at 7 or over—and open lists. This combination minimizes the influence of parties and complicates the ability of constituents to place credit or blame, which also reduces the importance of the cultivation of long-term constituent loyalty. The nature
of ambition also is central in defining an entrepreneur. The ideal typical entrepreneur is little interested in building a long-term career in Congress because either re-election is barred or the legislature is so weak (or lacks routine methods for resource extraction) that spending a career in it has little prestige; a legislative stint, therefore, would be instrumental only for building a career elsewhere. Entrepreneurs will tend to emerge more easily in federal than in unitary systems, because local reputation, rather than a party label, is more likely to be a key to success.

Where parties matter, entrepreneurs are more likely to emerge in systems with decentralized party organization, given the lack of central party enforcement mechanisms. The decisionmaking structure for selection is not formal and bureaucratic, nor do choices emerge from negotiation among patronage groups. Instead, informality and often, self-selection are the norm. Financing is underwritten by individuals or less formal special interests not tied to political parties, such as businesses. All these variables diminish the influence of parties or, indeed, make them unnecessary for entrepreneurs to get on the ballot and get elected. In terms of behavior, the entrepreneur is likely to seek any way to cultivate the instrumental and episodic support of voters at election time, rather than voters’ deeper loyalty. This type of candidate is likely to engage in more populist rhetoric and to discuss few particulars of ideology or policy. Entrepreneurs’ policymaking orientation is quite different from that of the three other types; and it is likely that presidents, even those from the same party, will have trouble maintaining governing coalitions (and even more trouble maintaining opposition coalitions). Too many entrepreneurs harm short-term efficiency; and without long-term legislative goals, they are unlikely to build the infrastructure that facilitates oversight capabilities and general legislative capacity.

Entrepreneurs are common in many Peruvian and Ecuadorian parties, in which the interaction of institutional and party variables yields less party loyalty and legislative discipline. Both Brazil and Colombia generate entrepreneurial legislators. Samuels points out that in most political systems, national or subnational party leaders exert some degree of control over nomination to legislative office, distribution of campaign financing, pork barrel patronage, or postlegislative career advancement. Yet Brazilian party leaders do not control any of these levers over deputies’ careers. Consequently, legislative party leaders’ influence is comparatively low in Brazil, because leaders cannot brandish these “sticks” at recalcitrant deputies. Samuels does emphasize that lack of control over nominations and candidate selection is only one of a series of variables that produce “entrepreneurs” in the terms set out here. “Vote whipping” and other tools to enforce discipline are effective only when the leadership makes credible threats to withhold valuable resources. Such threats lack credibility in Brazil (Samuels 2004).
A number of variables also conspire to create political entrepreneurs in Colombia. Escobar-Lemmon and Moreno argue that electoral norms and the dismantling of the National Front agreement, along with the reaction to the emergence of third party challenges, have enhanced self-selection and the emergence of entrepreneurs. The result has been an increasing reliance on one’s individual traits to further one’s career, which tends to reward those who have distinguished themselves as individuals. Escobar-Lemmon and Moreno (2004) provide a full treatment of the development of candidate selection norms and their effects in producing specific candidate types. The absence of legal barriers to running for office, combined with the lack of party control over nominations, has encouraged an increased number of candidates.

For Samuels (2004) as well as Escobar-Lemon and Moreno, this legislator type is strongly tied to the electoral system. The electoral systems in both Brazil and Colombia allow virtual self-nomination of candidates, thereby limiting leaders’ abilities to gain loyalty. Entrepreneurial legislators do not grow only out of the election system, however, given that they emerge alongside other types of legislators in countries where an identical election system is used. Therefore, once again, the source of different types of candidates resides in the interaction between institutional structure and the nature and character of political parties.

Escobar-Lemmon and Moreno show how, before Colombia’s significant electoral reform of 2003, the interaction of electoral system variables and party norms conspired to make particular nomination strategies attractive. The adoption of internal party norms that allowed for self-selection and the exploitation of the peculiarities of Colombia’s PR list system led to a strategy that has become known as *operación avispa* (plan swarm), in which party lists proliferated. Colombia employed a simple quota and largest remainders electoral system. Though this system is not uncommon, the Colombian situation, in which votes were not pooled for parties, was rare. The implications of this peculiarity are not trivial. For one thing, parties that submitted multiple lists tended to win seats relatively cheaply through remainders allocation. List proliferation, in turn, rewarded candidates with no prior experience because of their name recognition, which further encouraged entrepreneurial behavior.

In terms of concrete legislative behavior, Samuels has shown that the election of such legislators has important implications. Presidents must rely on other means (principally the provision of state pork), in effect, to buy the votes of entrepreneurial legislators. Without such incentives, presidents are unable to rely on consistent majorities. With respect to campaign activities, the highly personalistic nature of Brazilian congressional campaigns also points to the entrepreneurial tendencies that characterize most of the country’s political parties.
Group Delegates

Group delegates owe their primary loyalty to a particular nonparty functional or social group. This group may be a trade union, a business association, or a peasant, religious, separatist, or ethnic group. Table 1 shows group delegates as the only category in the typology in which four out of the five legal variables are simply designated as “indeterminate.” This indeterminacy is a central aspect of the framework, highlighting the importance of noninstitutional factors for the emergence of particular kinds of candidates.

Group delegates may emerge in all sorts of institutional contexts, but the crucial variable is the strength of the corporate group they represent. For example, if the parties of delegates simply recommend the election of a complete party slate and little personal differentiation among candidates, delegates may perform quite well in large-magnitude systems with closed lists. Alternatively, if party and functional group practice is to build personalistic followings, we may find that small-magnitude open-list systems are equally likely to encourage delegate candidacies. Similarly, delegates can emerge in unitary or federal systems, depending mostly on the geographical organization of the corporate group they represent. In essence, sometimes institutions matter a lot, and sometimes they matter much less.

In terms of party variables, it might seem that group interests trump those of the party, making the latter less significant. Parties and party organizations may still be nonetheless important when functional groups in the party exert some control over candidate selection, either in place of or in addition to the party (elite, base, or otherwise). Therefore, with respect to centralization, delegates emerge when parties are functionally rather than geographically organized. That is to say, delegates are likely to emerge when a functional group has some responsibility for naming and financing candidates.

The delegate will stress the interests of the functional group in the campaign and propose policies that serve that group’s interest nationally. Similarly, a delegate will more jealously guard the preferences and interests of the associated functional group. The delegate may seek personal votes, but this will depend on how central such votes are to the importance of advancing the group’s agenda. Group delegates should be disciplined, but they are likely to represent small minorities and may be particularly recalcitrant in coalitional bargaining. The consequences for policymaking are likely to be distinct, both when servants and delegates represent a governing party and when they are in the opposition.

Group delegates were the norm in the Brazilian PT before Lula’s election to the presidency, with the party’s intimate tie to labor. Gradually, as the PT became more institutionalized as a party, party structures
secured greater control over nominations, and its candidates moved gradually into the party loyalist category. During Mexico’s authoritarian era, some members of the PRI were also group delegates. Indeed, deputies were elected to represent directly the party’s various “pillars.” Group delegates can also be found today in several Andean nations where parties represent indigenous groups; Ecuador’s Pachakutik Party is a prime example, as is Bolivia’s MAS. Delegates may also be found among those representatives who occupy constitutionally mandated legislative seats for particular ethnic groups (beginning in 1991 in Colombia and 1999 in Venezuela). In each of these cases, campaign activity centers on stressing the interests and goals of the particular group that the delegates represent.

Table 3 summarizes the cases. The table is not intended to be exhaustive, and certainly does not include a comprehensive categorization of every party in the Americas. Instead, it points out parties discussed in this analysis that typify the four candidate types.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Constituent Group</th>
<th>Loyalist</th>
<th>Servant</th>
<th>Entrepreneur</th>
<th>Delegate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>PJ, UCR (though provincial party loyalists)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>PT(^a) (post-Lula)</td>
<td>Pre-1964 parties</td>
<td>PP, PTB, PMDB, PFL, PSDB</td>
<td>MAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>PT(^a) (post-Lula)</td>
<td>Pre-1964 parties</td>
<td>PP, PTB, PMDB, PFL, PSDB</td>
<td>PT(^a) (pre-Lula)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>PS, PPD, PDC, UDI, RN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>PL, PC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Pachakutik</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>PRI(^a)</td>
<td>PRD, PAN</td>
<td></td>
<td>PRI(^a) (certain members pre-1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Democratic Republican</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>PC, PN, FA (though party faction loyalists)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Parties that at different times fit different categories
PATHWAYS TO POWER AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

This article has pointed to the variables that produce different types of legislative candidates in Latin America. Its deeper goal has been to provide a schematic model and a stylized typology that together yield a theoretical framework for understanding and comparatively analyzing both the processes that bring politicians to power and, equally important, how those processes affect the political behavior of the powerful. By providing this necessarily tentative framework to analyze the causes and effects of recruitment and selection, this study aims to enable country experts who, through the use of focused cross-national case studies, will fill a large gap in our understanding of political behavior.

Another goal has been to show that recruitment and selection norms are more than just a simple response to a country’s institutional framework; they emerge from the complex interaction of institutional and party variables. This study has demonstrated, moreover, that the behavior of candidates and legislators is shaped by the processes that bring them to power.

The findings presented here are theoretically important in two ways. First, understanding the real incentives for political behavior in Latin America is crucial for institutional analysts and reformers who are concerned with democratic governability. This study has argued that reformers should consider the effect of R&S procedures when contemplating reforms, as these party-level rules and norms interact with the electoral system and other institutions to determine the behavior of candidates and elected officials. Mandating primaries, for example, may—but will not necessarily—generate more internal party democracy, as some parties could contravene the law’s decentralizing intention with creative rules, such as centralized control of campaign funds or ballot access rules that are biased in favor of one or another candidate.

Second, the findings in this study are even more relevant to understanding the sources of stability and governability in Latin America’s multiparty presidential systems. Latin American presidencies are often criticized as unstable, uninstitutionalized, or tending toward “delegative democracy” (O’Donnell 1994) due to their structural problems (including the difficulties associated with minority-supported presidents), the type and quality of the leadership the systems have produced, and other factors (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Linz and Valenzuela 1994). Scholars have recognized that presidentialism is much more sustainable when presidents can rely on majorities or near-majorities of their own parties. This study shows that legislative behavior and the likelihood that a legislator will support a president are more than just a function of a country’s institutional structure or the nature of that legislator’s party. Instead,
R&S can shape the likelihood that a legislator will support or oppose a president of the same party (or act in concert as part of an opposition party). The likelihood of interbranch cooperation would be enhanced where a president can rely on party loyalists of the same party. We must also consider, of course, the possibility that party loyalists in the opposition can act as an impediment to the building of such majorities.

Whatever the answer to these questions, this study shows that in these important ways, R&S is not just about the pathways to power, but also about how those pathways can have a more important effect on legislative behavior and the governability of presidential systems than has been supposed up to now.

**Notes**

This article sets out the initial elaboration of a wider framework for executive and legislative candidate selection, which is employed in the book *Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America* (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008). This book also contains case studies that use the framework.

1. Scholars are just beginning to analyze informal institutions. See Helmke and Levitsky 2004.

2. Some work has been published on the connection between selection procedures and the character of legislators and composition of legislatures, but less on how the processes affect behavior. See, e.g., Loewenberg and Patterson 1979; Keynes et al. 1979.

3. For some cases, the level of analysis moves from parties to factions or coalitions. Here, generally, we refer to parties but recognize that at times our analysis also applies to factions or coalitions.

4. While the term *loyalty* can have positive connotations, it is used here as a nonnormative analytical tool.

5. Theory building entails a combination of deductive and inductive reasoning. The basic hypothesis about types of candidates is shaped partly by observable types of legislative activity. In addition, these types correspond to the various dimensions of representation set out in the literature analyzing representational orientations of legislators. See Ryden 1996; Pitkin 1972.

6. Hazan and Voerman (2006) also provide a convincing rationale for separately analyzing inclusiveness and centralization.

**References**


